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GRAND JURY REPORTS-A SAFEGUARD
OF DEMOCRACY
NOAH WEINSTEINt WILLIAM J. SHAW*
The right of a grand jury to report on the actions of public officials
and on general conditions in its community offers to the citizens of a
democracy a most effective means of controlling gross inefficiency or
misconduct of public officers. One of the appealing facets of the ac-
tivity of a grand jury in reporting upon conditions and public officials
is the absence of authoritarian efficiency, and this has not detracted
from its importance as an effective safeguard of citizens' rights in a
democracy. A grand jury is a short-lived, representative, non-political
body of citizens functioning without hope of personal aggrandizement.
It comes from the citizens at large and soon disappears into its ano-
nymity without individual recognition or personal reward and without
ability to perpetuate itself in the public hierarchy. Grand juries are
not remembered by the names of the individual members, but are re-
called or forgotten by what they may have accomplished or failed to
accomplish.
Reports (referred to by some authorities as a type of presentment
as distinguished from an indictment charging crime and a self-gener-
ating presentment charging crime) by grand juries have generally
been recognized as a common law function of the grand jury since the
Middle Ages.1
t Circuit Judge, St. Louis County, Missouri.
* First Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, St. Louis County, Missouri.
1. This matter has been thoroughly researched, and it would be presumptuous
on our part to attempt to add anything to the already existing exhaustive studies
on this subject.
The following paragraphs from Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment"; Foul
Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L. Rav. 1103 (1955), are a concise statement of
the common law background of this grand jury power:
Early Use of the Grand Jury Report
An objection voiced today to the grand jury report is that the secrecy
obligation of the jury is violated when, without charging crime, it issues a
report. This objection ignores the historic fact that grand jury reports were
utilized during the years when the jury was developing as an instrument
against despotism.
In 1683, an English grand jury in Chester, without returning a formal
indictment charged certain Whigs, including the Earl of Macclesfield, with
disloyal and seditious conduct. The Earl sued the members of the grand
jury for libel. [Proceedings between Charles Earl of Macclesfield and John
Starkey, Esq., [1684-85J 10 How. St. Tr. 1330.] In defense, on oral argument,
it was urged that "it is the constant universal practice" of grand juries to
present to court any matters concerning the business of the county, and that
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The necessity of a grand jury system to protect the people from
abuses of government and to maintain a well informed citizenry is
more imperative in this age of complex government than it was at the
time of the inception of the system, when we lived in a rural society.2
The scope of this article is limited to the legality and need of reports
by grand juries which do not indict but which do criticize conditions
and public officials.
The first Constitution for the State of Missouri2 contained a "Decla-
this was commonly done in "every assizes and sessions." [Id. at 1355.] In
answer to this, plaintiff's contention was to the effect that "the law never did
impower a jury or any other, to blast any man's reputation without possi-
bility to clear it," and that grand juries may lodge only specific charges
of crime. The defense also urged that if a grand jury learned of any na-
tional danger, the jurors' oaths bound them to make "prudent and discreet
representations of their fears, and the grounds and reasons of them." [Id.
at 1371.] The court, without opinion, unanimously found for the defendants,
apparently sustaining the propriety of grand jury reports.
Sidney and Beatrice Webb have set forth specific instances of early grand
jury inquiries into misconduct of royal officers. [S. and B. Webb, English
Local Government from the Revolution to the Municipal Corporations Act:
The Parish and the County 448-456 (1906). See also 10 Holdsworth, A
History of English Law 146-51 (1938).] They mentioned grand jury reports
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries criticizing constables and jus-
tices for their abusive market practices. They also referred to reports on
horseracing and cockfighting, on the supervision by the justices of houses
of correction, on the use by innkeepers and vendors of false drink measures,
on the improper care of bridges, gaols, highways, and other county property,
and on justices of the peace who accepted excessive fees. A Gloucestershire
grand jury in 1678 noted the increasing beggar nuisance and suggested
that the constables, and others so charged, enforce the law. In 1697, a
county coroner was criticized by an Essex County grand jury for "vexing"
a coroner's jury that failed to follow his direction to find a verdict.
This grand jury practice of issuing reports on matters of public concern
was followed in the American colonies. In New York in 1688, a grand jury
urged that persons selling liquor should keep lodgings. [Goebel & Naughton,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 361-63.] Subsequent New York colonial grand juries
reported on highway repair and other matters of state proprietorship. Grand
juries in New Jersey rendered reports on matters of public affairs as early
as 1680. [See In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 41-44, 89 A.2d
416, 426-428 (1952).] In Virginia, it was common practice for grand juries
to express their opinions on colonial administration. [Scott, Criminal Law
in Colonial Virginia 70-71 (1930).]
Konowitz, The Grand Jury as an Investigating Body of Publio Officials, 10
ST. JOHN'S L. Ruv. 219, 221 (1936) states: "A general investigation was per-
mitted at common law even though there was no specific charge before it, and
no suspect named. This practice was carried over into this country." (Footnotes
omitted.) See also dissenting opinion of Judge Froessel in Wood v. Hughes, 173
N.E.2d 21, 30, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 45 (1961).
2. In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 65-66, 89 A.2d 416, 443
(1952). See notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
3. Mo. CONST. (1820).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/4
A SAFEGUARD
ration of Rights" which provided that in criminal proceedings the
accused had the right to a speedy trial "in prosecution on presentment
or indictment,"' and that no person could be proceeded against crimi-
nally by information for an indictable offense except in certain military
cases or "by leave of the court, for oppression or misdemeanor in
office." The constitution of 1865 contained identical references.6
The constitution of 1875 provided that a grand jury should consist
of twelve men, any nine of whom concurring could find an indictment
or true bill.7 In 1900 this section of the Constitution was amended and
the following was added to the above:
Provided, however, that no grand jury shall be convened except
upon an order of a judge of a court having the power to try and
determine felonies; but when so assembled such grand jury shall
have power to investigate and return indictments for all character
and grades of crime.,
The 1875 constitution originally contained a provision (art. II, section
12) which was substantially the same as art. I, section xxiv of the
1865 constitution. However, this was amended in 1900 to establish,
for the first time, indictment and information as "concurrent reme-
dies." 9 Other references to grand juries were contained in art IV,
section 53, no. 30, which prohibited the General Assembly from pass-
ing a local or special law summoning or empaneling grand and petit
juries," and a technical reference to the effect of the new constitution
on pending or future indictments." The constitution of 1875 also
contained a reference to grand juries in the "Miscellaneous Provi-
sions": "It shall be the duty of the grand jury in each county, at least
once a year, to investigate the official acts of all officers having charge
of public funds, and report the result of their investigations in writing
to the court." 2
It is not surprising that the 1875 constitution, as originally adopted,
has been criticized because of "its ordinary legislative characteristics,
its detailed grant of powers and restrictions, its session acts rather
than fundamental, organic provisions."'' 3 However that may be, it is
4. Mo. CONST. art. XIII, cl. 9 (1820). See also Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 19 (1820).
5. Mo. CONST. art. XIII, cl. 14 (1820).
6. Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ XVIII & XXIV (1865). See also Mo. CONST. art. XI,
§ XII and art. VI, § XXVI (1865).
7. Mo. CONST. art. II, § 28 (1875).
8. Mo. CONST. art. II, § 28 (1875) as amended.
9. Mo. CoNsT. art. II, § 12 (1875) as amended.
10. Mo. CoNsT. art. IV, § 53, no. 30 (1875).
11. Mo. CONST. Schedule of 1875, § 2.
12. Mo. CoNST. art. XIV, § 11 (1875).
18. Bishop, Government of Missouri Under the Constitution of 1945, 1 V.A.M.S.
1, 6 (1949).
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worthy of note that prior to November 30, 1875, Missouri had no
constitutional reference to the make up and powers of a grand jury
other than vague, general references in prior constitutions which as-
sumed that grand juries did exist and could return indictments or
presentments.
Despite this paucity of constitutional authority, grand juries were
always a recognized and integral part of criminal justice and proce-
dure in Missouri. As early as 1829 the Supreme Court of Missouri,
without the benefit of express constitutional authority, accepted the
grand jury as "a body known to the law,"'14 with the duty "to enquire
diligently of all offences against law."'0 Undoubtedly the framers of
our constitutions, when they declared that no person could be "de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers,
or the law of the land" as set out in the 182010 and 186517 constitutions
or "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law" as in the 187518 and 194510 constitutions, intended
to and did adopt as the law of the land all established safeguards for
the rights and protection of the individual known to the law since
Magna Charta.
The constitution of 1945 contains, for the first time, a separate para-
graph relating to the grand jury in the following terms:
That a grand jury shall consist of tvelve citizens, any nine of
whom concurring may find an indictment or a true bill: provided,
that no grand jury shall be convened except upon an order of ajudge of a court having the power to try and determine felonies;
but when so assembled such grand jury shall have power to in-
vestigate and return indictments for all character and grades of
crime; and that the power of grand juries to inquire into the
willful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find indict-
ments in connection therewith, shall never be suspended.20
What is the legal import of this new and additional reference to
grand juries which declares "that the power of grand juries to investi-
gate the willful misconduct of public officials and to indict in connec-
tion therewith shall never be suspended"? The power of grand juries
14. Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120, 122 (1829).
15. Id. at 121.
16. Mo. CONsT. art. 8, § 9 (1820).
17. Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18 (1865).
18. M o. CONST. art. 2, § 30 (1875).
19. Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10.
20. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 16. The italicized portion represents an addition to an
otherwise identical provision in the 1875 constitution as amended Nov. 6, 1900.
Mo. CoNsT. art. 2, § 28 (1875 amended 1900). The phrase "twelve men" was
changed to twelve citizens.
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to indict for crime had been constitutionally assumed until 187521 and
judicially recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 1829.22 What
impelled the framers of the 1945 constitution to the conclusion that
they should, as a part of the Bill of Rights, include a specific prohibi-
tion against the suspension of the grand jury right to inquire into the
misconduct of public officials and to find indictments in connection
therewith? All prior constitutions had contained provisions declaring
that no person could be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. "Due process of law" and the "law of the land"
being legal equivalents, 23 this constitutional safeguard preserved in-
violate the established law of England at the time of the adoption of
our first constitution.2 4 This established law included the right to trial
by jury or the lack of such right in certain instances, 25 as well as
indictment or information by a grand jury or proper prosecuting
official .2
It would appear reasonable to assume that the framers of the 1945
constitution were not fearful of the loss of these universally accepted
elements of "due process," but rather were concerned with possible
curtailment of other rights of the public. In order to determine the
meaning of this constitutional provision it is proper to consult the
Debates of the 1945 Constitutional Convention.27
An examination of the transcript of the debates of the Missouri
Constitutional Convention which resulted in the 1945 constitution dis-
closes that the delegates to the convention gave specific consideration
to the following language which became the last part of section 16,
Article I of the new constitution:
And that the power of grand juries to inquire into willful mis-
conduct in office of public officers and to find indictments in con-
nection therewith shall never be suspended.
The thoughts of the delegates can best be presented by a review of
the record made as they debated and considered reasons for placing
21. Bishop, Government of Missouri Under the Constitution of 1945, 1
V.A.M.S. 1, 6 (1949).
22. Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120 (1829).
23. State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 174, 31 S.W. 781, 782 (1895).
24. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.010 (1959). State v. Harp, 320 Mo. 1, 8, 6 S.W.2d
562, 564 (1928) ; State ex inf. Crow v. Shepard, 177 Mo. 205, 242, 76 S.W. 79, 89
(1903).
25. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepard, supra note 24.
26. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); State v. Kelm, 79 Mo.
515 (1883); Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102, 106 (1880).
27. Preisler v. Hayden, 309 S.W. 2d 645, 646 (Mo. 1958).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
this provision in the constitution. Accordingly, the verbatim record
relating to this provision is set forth below.28
28. Excerpts from the transcript of the debates of the Missouri Constitutional
Convention, April 18 and April 19, 1944, pages 1433-37. These transcripts are
available on microfilm at the Law Library in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, (St.
Louis Law Library Association), and the St. Louis Public Library, and the law
libraries of the law schools of Washington University and St. Louis University.
The transcripts, original or copies, are held by the Secretary of State, Supreme
Court Library, Missouri University Law School Library, and the Missouri His-
torical Society at Columbia, Missouri.
MR. STEVENS: Mr. President, before we leave this section I've another
amendment.
PRESIDENT: An amendment to the Bill of Rights file?
MR. STEVENS: Section 26.
(Amendment brought forward and read as follows:)
PRESIDENT: Is this an amendment to Section 26?
MR. STEVENS: Yes, Mr. President. This is on another subject though.
(Clerk read as follows:)
"CONVENTION AMENDMENT NO. 28 offered by Mr. Stevens of the
25th District. Amend File No. 8, Article 1, Page 10, Section 26, by
adding in line 17 after the period, the following: 'The power of grand
juries to inquire into the wilful misconduct in office of public officers,
and to find indictments in connection with such inquiries shall never be
suspended or impaired by law.'
MR. STEVENS: Mr. President, I move the adoption of the admendment.
PRESIDENT: Is there a second.
(Motion seconded by Mr. Garten.)
MR. STEVENS: Mr. President, the only argument I want to make on this
amendment is to read an editorial from a magazine known as the Grand
Jury Association of New York County and called "The Panel." This amend-
ment is taken from the Constitution of New York with a very slight change.
I read the editorial. "This Association can take justifiable pride in its suc-
cessful sponsorship of the recent constitutional amendment which safeguards
the rights and prerogatives of the grand jury by writing these into the
constitutional law of the state. Already embodied in the statutory law, the
grand jury's rights are now removed from legislative whim and transferred
over into the constitution where only a majority vote of the people can
change them. Specifically the provision reads"--this is a New York pro-
vision---'The power of grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct
in office of public officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing
of information in connection with such inquiries shall never be suspended
or impaired by law. This proposal was included in Amendment No. I to
the state constitution which was passed by vote of the people on November 8,
last." This magazine was published in 1939. "Once again by this vote the
people of New York have registered their confidence in the grand jury
system prevailing in this state and once again the Association has made a
contribution to the public in introducing and sponsoring this amendment.
"In one respect the passage of this amendment was made easier in New York
by the example of grand jury manipulation in the neighboring state of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/4
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The delegate who proposed the inclusion of the clause, Stevens,
happened to be an experienced and able lawyer who practiced his pro-
fession in St. Louis County for many years. The reference to him as
Pennsylvania. Indeed, it was the act of the governor in calling a special
session of the legislature to vote curbs on a Harrisburg grand jury that
inspired this Association to take action in New York.
"People in New York state know all too well what an informed and intelli-
gent grand jury means to the law enforcement machinery of this state.
They have seen too many recent examples of public service resulting from
grand jury activity."
Now, Mr. President, it seems to me that we ought to avoid any possibility of
any legislature or governor trying to abolish or curb the grand jury right to
inquire into the officials of public office of this state by putting a clause like
this in our Constitution. You all remember only too well what happened
in the state of Louisiana when Huey Long was in his prime down there, and
virtually the grand jury and all other agencies charged with the investigation
of public officials were abolished. The same thing happened in Pennsylvania
and that is why the New York Constitution in 1939 put a similar clause in
their Constitution whereby a grand jury's investigation of the official acts of
public officials will never be abridged. I think it is a wise clause to put in this
Constitution. It is being urged by the Grand Jury Association of St. Louis
and St. Louis County, an association composed of some of our most represen-
tative citizens, who in the past, have sat on state or federal grand juries.
MR. MARR: Mr. President, I'd like to interrogate Judge Stevens. Judge
Stevens, I have no objection to a brief general statement as an amendment
to this section providing that grand juries shall not be abolished, but I ques-
tion the wisdom of singling out specific things which they shall not be pro-
hibited from doing. Now, there are many, many things that a grand jury can
do at different times, that they have the power to inquire into. Do you think
it's proper to single out one particular thing that they shall not be abolished
or prevented from doing, or would it be sufficient to provide that grand
juries, briefly, should not be abolished.
MR. STEVENS: Well, I think the important thing is to prevent any legis-
lature from trying to curb the activities of a grand jury when they come to
investigate public officials. That's where the harm will come. For instance,
suppose we had a Huey Long in the state of Missouri, and you had a Cole
County grand jury investigation and Huey Long of Missouri controlled the
legislature. He might call the legislature in here to curb the power of grand
juries to investigate official acts of all his hirelings. You have a clause like
this, he can't do it, and that's where you get the pressure to abolish the grand
jury. You don't particularly need a grand jury to file information or indict-
ments anymore against individuals who commit crimes, because the prosecut-
ing attorney, the Attorney General, can do that, but you do need to main-
tain the grand jury to curb the corrupt act of officials, and I have just
followed the New York Constitutional provision.
MR. MARR: I agree with you in your purpose and think it's a good thing,
but I just wondered whether we should do it in that way, by stating that they
shall not be prohibited from doing specific things. I wondered if it couldn't be
in language broad enough to cover any functions of the grand jury.
Mr. STEVENS: Well, I don't think there would ever be any occasion to
worry about the acts of a grand jury upon an individual. It is only when
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Judge stems from the fact that he was chosen by the local lawyers to
fill the unexpired term of a Circuit Judge who was absent on military
leave. As Stevens expressed it, he was concerned about the possibility
of curbing the right of grand juries "to inquire into the officials of
public office." He referred to the activity of Huey Long in "virtually
they are investigating officials that are in power that you are liable to have
some official try to pass a law to abolish a grand jury system or to curb their
rights of investigation, and my thought in this proposition was to fix the con-
stitution so that no corrupt legislature or governmental power could curb the
right of a grand jury to investigate. We don't have it now. We probably
haven't had it many years, but we may have it, and I think it's a wise pro-
vision to retain that in the Constitution. There is a similar section now, only
it's rather garbled and miscellaneous that we struck out. It didn't mean very
much, and I think probably we did well in striking it out there. It didn't have
any teeth in it, but this prohibits any legislature from ever abolishing or in-
terfering with the grand juries' investigations of public officials, and that is
where you get your pressure in the event you have a corrupt government.
MR. MARR: As I understand you, you figure that is the only possible source
of any agitation to abolish the grand juries. That is the reason you make it
specific.
MR. STEVENS: Well, I followed the New York Constitution, Mr. Marr,
because they have a powerful grand jury organization in New York. They
have had it for years. It's been functioning there for twenty-five years, an
association called The Grand Jury Association, who have given this matter
much more study than I have and much more study, I think, than the Grand
Jury Association of St. Louis and St. Louis County, and it was their wisdom
which put this section in the New York Constitution because of what hap-
pened principally in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where the legislature tried to
curb the investigation of official acts by laws that they were trying to pass.
MR. MARR: Thank you.
MR. GARTEN: I am inclined to think this is a very good amendment. As
Mr. Stevens has said there was something of the sort in the Miscellaneous
Provisions Article, and I voted to repeal that under the apprehension that it
wasn't necessary. It required that there should be an organization of a
grand jury to investigate the conduct of public officials in office, and I thought
it wasn't necessary to have that provision, but they could do that anyhow,
and some of the lawyers of the Convention, have since told me that that
doesn't necessarily follow, and I believe such provision as Mr. Stevens has
suggested here might be a very valuable and salutary restraint upon conduct
of offices by officeholders, and I think we should give it some consideration
and personally I think we should adopt it.
MR. MCVAY: I make a motion that we adjourn until tomorrow morning.
NOTE: Convention was adjourned until 9:30 o'clock A. M., April 19, 1944.
Convention was called to order by President
Blake on Wednesday, April 19, 1944, at 9:30 A. M.
PRESIDENT: File 8 Section 26 pending on Mr. Stevens' amendment. Any
discussion on Mr. Stevens' amendment?
MR. MARR: Members of the Convention, I am of the opinion that Judge
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abolishing" the grand jury and all other agencies charged with the
investigation of public officials, as well as similar action in Pennsyl-
vania.
Stevens was emphatic in declaring that:
You don't particularly need a grand jury to file information or
indictments anymore against individuals who commit crimes, be-
cause the prosecuting attorney, the Attorney General, can do that,
but you do need to maintain the grand jury to curb the corrupt
act of officials ... 29
This delegate did not have any concern about grand juries activity
which affected individuals but "it is only when they are investigating
officials that are in power that you are liable to have some official try
to pass a law to abolish a grand jury system or to curb their rights of
investigation."30 Stevens referred specifically to the provisions con-
tained in par. 11, Art. XIV of the 1875 constitution,31 and described
it as:
rather garbled and miscellaneous that we struck out. It didn't
mean very much, and I think probably we did well in striking it
out there. It didn't have any teeth in it, but this (referring to his
proposal) prohibits any legislature from ever abolishing or inter-
fering with the grand juries' investigations of public officials, and
that is where you get your pressure in the event you have a cor-
rupt government.3 2
The statements of delegate Garten are also revealing. Garten ex-
pressed himself in the following vein:
I am inclined to think this is a very good amendement. As Mr.
Stevens has said there was something of the sort in the Miscel-
laneous Provisions Article, 3 and I voted to repeal that under the
Stevens' amendment is a good one and as Chairman of this Committee I am
not making any opposition to it.
PRESIDENT: Any further discussion? Judge Stevens, would you like to
close the discussion?
MR. STEVENS: Mr. President, I don't think there is any more that I can
say in the matter than I said yesterday.
(Chorus of "Question.")
PRESIDENT: Question is on the adoption of Mr. Stevens' amendment to
Section 26. As many as are in favor of the amendment, let it be known by
saying "Aye" ... Contrary "No." The ayes have it. The amendment is
approved.
29. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
30. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
31. See text accompanying notes 3-11, supra.
32. Emphasis added.
33. This reference is to Miscellaneous Provisions in Mo. CONST. art. XIV, § 11
(1875).
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apprehension that it wasn'it necessary. It required that there
should be an organization of a grand jury to investigate the con-
duct of public officials in office, and I thought it wasn't necessary
to have that provision, but they could do that anyhow . ..and I
believe such provision as Mr. Stevens has suggested here might be
a very valuable and salutory restraint upon conduct of offices by
officeholders. . . .34
The debates of the constitutional delegates on the provisions of
Section 11, Art. XIV, of the 1875 constitution3 are also revealing.
Much has been said to the effect that the delegates in eliminating this
provision intended thereby to restrict the powers of grand juries and
specifically to prohibit their power to report. How far from the facts
this conclusion really is can again best be demonstrated by the words
of the delegates to the 1945 Constitutional Convention.
The Journal of the Convention"0 refers to "File No. 7, Report of the
Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions, No. 20."'37 Section 9 of File
No. 738 sets out the exact provisions of Section 11, Art. XIV, of the
1875 Constitution, to-wit: "It shall be the duty of the grand jury in
each county, at least once a year, to investigate the official acts of all
officers having charge of public funds, and report the result of their
investigations, in writing, to the court." Page 7 of the Journal then
records that "Section 9 was taken up. Mr. Searcy offered Amendment
No. 4, which was read: "AMENDMENT No. 4: Amend File No. 7,
Page 3, Section 9, by striking out all of said Section 9." Thereafter
an unsuccessful attempt was made by delegate Stevens to offer a sub-
stitute motion which would have the effect of striking out of Sec. 9 of
File No. 7 (Section 11, Art. XIV, 1875 Constitution) the words "at
least once a year." Then delegate Searcy moved the adoption of his
amendment which motion was seconded and passed.3
Some of the pertinent statements made by Searcy at the convention
on March 28, 1944 in support of his motion to eliminate Section 11,
Art. XIV, 1875 Constitution are as follows:
Searcy: "In the first instance, I want every Delegate to under-
stand that this is not a stroke at the Grand Jury system."
Searcy: "This section No. 9 in report before us is one hundred
per cent legislative .. . I think it should be taken out
for that reason."
34. Emphasis added.
35. See text accompanying note 12, supra.
36. 1943-1944 MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIoN 2 (March 28, 1944).
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 7.
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Searcy: "I think in behalf of the poor counties in Missouri who
are forced into an expense that they cannot pay under
our constitutional limits, they should be relieved of this
expense. I move the adoption of the amendment.140
It would seem fair to conclude that the purpose of the delegates in
eliminating the provisions contained in Section 11, Art. XIV, 1875
Constitution, was first to relieve the poor counties in Missouri from
the burden of paying the cost of a yearly grand jury, which they
thought that provision required, secondly to eliminate from the con-
stitution a provision that was legislative rather than constitutional.41
The mover of the amendment expressly declared that the action was
not to curtail the grand jury's power.
If any consideration is to be given to the intention of the framers
of the constitution of 1945, the following conclusions are inescapable:
1. The power of a grand jury lies not in its ability to file informa-
tions or indictments since the prosecuting attorney has sufficient power
to do that.
2. The primary need of a grand jury lies in its ability "to curb the
corrupt act of officials" and it was this specific power which the fram-
ers of the constitution sought to protect from abolition or encroach-
ment.
3. That the purpose in eliminating the "Miscellaneous Provisions"
clause in Section 11, Art. XIV of the 1875 Constitution was monetary,
and the Stevens proposal would not only encompass the powers con-
tained in that clause but would enlarge, strengthen and guarantee
investigations by grand juries of public officials all in addition to their
secondary power to file indictments and informations.
Statutory authority additionally exists which supports the power
of grand juries in Missouri to file reports. Section 540.020,42 directs
the grand jury:
(2) to examine public buildings, and report on their conditions;
. . . [to] make careful inquiry into the failure or refusal of
county and municipal officers to do their duty, as provided by law
. . . to make inquiry into any violations by county officers of laws
relating to the finances or financial administration of the county.4 3
It should be noted that this Section 540.020 consists of two para-
graphs. The substantial contents of paragraph 2 are noted above.
Paragraph 1 of that statute gives grand juries the power to investi-
gate and return indictments for all grades of crimes. It is apparent
that the legislature (as did the constitutional delegates) intended to
40. See note 28 supra at 873-83, March 28, 1944.
41. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
42. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1959).
43. Emphasis added.
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distinguish clearly between the power of a grand jury to indict and the
power of the grand jury to examine buildings and report thereon, and
to inquire into the conduct of county and municipal officers and to
report thereon, and to inquire into the finances of the country and to
report thereon.
Since both the constitution and Section 540.020 give the grand jury
the power and also place upon it the duty to indict for all grades of
crime, the additional provisions in both the constitution and statutes
in regard to their investigation of public officials must logically entail
a right to report. Common sense dictates that inefficiency, careless-
ness, or neglect may require correction and yet not justify indictment.
All willful or corrupt misconduct in public office does not necessarily
constitute a criminal offense; yet in a democracy, the public is entitled
to know what its representatives in government are doing if for no
other reason than to be knowledgeable when the time comes to consider
retention in office or the termination in office of their elected officials.
It was no less a public figure than William J. Brennan, Jr., now a
member of the United States Supreme Court, who, while a member of
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, reaffirmed" certain principles pre-
viously concurred in by him when they were originally announced by
Judge Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court"; relating to grand
jury presentments or reports without indictment. Both judges con-
cluded that the practice of grand jury reports was imported to this
country from England three centuries ago as a part of the common
law and that if presentments of matters of public concern were neces-
sary in the public interest in the relatively simple conditions of Eng-
lish and colonial life three centuries ago, it is much more essential now
in these days when government at all levels has taken on a complexity
of organization and of operation that defies the best intentions of the
citizens to know and understand it. Both judges stated that:
What is not known and understood is likely to be distrusted. What
cannot be investigated in a republic is likely to be feared. The
maintenance of popular confidence in government requires that
there be some body of laymen which may investigate any instances
of public wrongdoing. ...
The grand jury provides a readily available group of representa-
tive citizens of the county empowered, as occasion may demand,
to voice the conscience of the community. There are many official
acts and omissions that fall short of criminal misconduct and yet
are not in the public interest. It is very much to the public ad-
vantage that such conduct be revealed in an effective, official way.
No community desires to live a hairbreadth above the criminal
44. State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 437, 117 A.2d 499, 502-03 (1955).




level, which might well be the case if there were no official organ
of public protest. Such presentments are a great deterrent to
official wrongdoing. By exposing wrongdoing, moreover, such
presentments inspire public confidence in the capacity of the body
politic to purge itself of untoward conditions.4 6
The scope of grand jury reporting has historically been limited to
persons in government service and general conditions in a community.
Comment has been made upon the unfairness of such reports, particu-
larly as they affect any public official. However, we should bear in
mind that the great protector of our democracy, Thomas Jefferson,
declared that: "When a man assumes a public trust, he should consider
himself as public property. ' 4 7 Moral theologians approve public criti-
cism of public officials as being in the public good, although they con-
demn such criticism of individuals not having public responsibilities.48
As stated more recently, the exposure of public officials to damaging
grand jury reports:
is an occupational hazard of the uneasy trade of public service,
part of the price which office holding exacts and part of the pro-
tection of the public weal in a free society. No court has the right
to cut down that protection. And nothing is more hostile to the
central spirit of American political philosophy than to allow any
public office to suppress and bury a relevant, nonscandalous
commentary on public affairs by an authorized body of citizens.49
The benefit to the public resulting from justifiable charges of wrong-
doing by public officials substantially overbalances any possible harm
done to the individuals affected thereby. That occasionally grand
juries may err is not only a human fault of grand juries but is an
unavoidable ingredient in any democratic process that would avoid
authoritarian efficiency. Judge Learned Hand has said:
No doubt grand juries err and indictments are calamities to hon-
est men, but we must work with human beings and we can correct
such errors only at too large a price. Our dangers do not lie in
too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been al-
ways haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an
unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and
the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prose-
cution of crime.5 "
46. State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 437, 117 A.2d 499, 503 (1955), citing In Tre
Camden County Grand Jury, supra note 45.
47. RAYNER, LirFE OF JEFFERSON 356 (Boston ed. 1832), in FOLEY, THE JEFFER-
SONIAN CYcLoPEDIA II 8596, at 887 (1900).
48. 2 McHuGH & CALLAN, MORAL THEOLOGY 241 (1930).
49. Wood v. Hughes, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 45, 173 N.E.2d 21, 30 (Ct. App. 1961)
(dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Desmond).
50. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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Even citizens are known to make mistakes in exercising their voting
privilege, but no one has yet advocated that because of such mistakes
they should be disenfranchised. 51
It should be remembered that not all indictments returned by a
grand jury are pursued to trial; nor that all grand jury indictments
pursued to trial result in the conviction of the person charged with
crime by the grand jury. Nor for that matter are all persons charged
with crime, whether by grand jury indictment or any other process
known to man, and subsequently found guilty, necessarily guilty in
fact although they obviously are guilty in law." Finally, we should be
frank enough to concede that innocent men have been hanged in the
past and will be hanged in the future unless either the death penalty
is abolished or the fallibility of human judgment is abolished and
judges, prosecutors, and grand jurors become supermen. 3
Thus, subject to all the conditions of human fallibility, it is apparent
that grand jury investigations and reports resulting therefrom offer a
better forum for investigations because of certain judicial controls.
Those reports which the court might consider irrelevant or ill-founded
may be rejected by the court before filing or expunged by the court on
motion of the offended party.- And those reports which are accepted
by the court should receive the same protection given all judicial pro-
ceedings, that is the status of "absolute privilege" as to libel. This
privilege would not only extend to the grand jury members, but to the
reproduction and circulation of the reports by others.
Occasionally the position of those advocating reports of grand juries
which criticize but do not indict has been criticized as representing
the views of those who are prosecution oriented. It is insinuated that
such a position is in conflict with the natural rights of man as pro-
tected by bills of rights. But those who advocate the abolition of the
grand jury's power to criticize officials are quick to deny that public
officials should be elevated to the sacrosanct category of persons be-
yond the pale of criticisms. The abolitionists must and do admit that
in a democracy the right to investigate and criticize must exist. But
they would curtail this admitted democratic ideal by eliminating the
body of citizens who constitute a grand jury and transfer this right to
some full time paid official who would be expected to investigate and
report the wrongdoings of his fellow office holders !
51. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
52. See FRANK, NOT GuILTY (1957); CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC
MAN ch. 1 (1961).
53. KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING ch. 8 (1957) ; HALE, HANGED IN ERROR
(1961).
54. State eX Tel. Lashly v. Wurdeman, 187 S.W. 257 (Mo. 1916).
55. See cases collected in 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 343 (1955).
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Thomas Jefferson, the drafter of our Declaration of Independence,
agreed so completely with the writings of Locke, and particularly
Locke's The Second Treatise of Civil Government, that occasionally
Jefferson has been accused of copying the Second Treatise. The think-
ing of Jefferson and Locke has many close connections. In political
theory and practice, the American Revolution drew its inspiration
from the parliamentary struggle of seventeenth century England. The
philosophy of the Declaration was old-English doctrine revised to
meet the then-present emergency 6
In Locke's The Second Treatise of Civil Government, he asked: If
man in the state of nature be so free as to be absolute lord of his own
person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody,
why will he give up his freedom and empire and subject himself to the
dominion and control of any other power? Locke answered: Though
man in the state of nature has such right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others. This
makes him willing to quit a condition which, however free, is full of
fears and continual danger. For this reason he is willing to join in
society with others for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties
and property. 7 Locke wrote his Two Treatises of Government to
justify the Revolution of 1688 and the ascension of William to the
throne of England.
Locke's Second Treatise has been described as the epitome of Anglo-
American ideals and as presenting the distillation of a wisdom derived
from centuries of struggle for liberty and justice in government. Un-
questionably, Locke was the main source of the idea of the American
Revolution. In this light we should consider that Locke recognized as
fundamental that the end of government is the good of the community
and no member of the community can have a right tending to any
other end. Thus liberty under government is not affected when restric-
tions are imposed upon those actions of individuals which prejudice or
hinder the public good.18
John Stuart Mill in 1859 published his great defense of the indi-
vidual's right to think and act for himself.5 9 In somewhat familiar
language he declares that all human action should aim at creating,
maintaining, and increasing the greatest happiness of the greatest
number of people. One of the most important ways for society to in-
sure that its members will be able to contribute their maximum to
creating, preserving, and increasing the greatest happiness of the
greatest number is to extend to them the right to think and act for
56. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 79 (1922).
57. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVmI GOVERNMENT 62 (1946).
58. Id. at 81-82.
59. MmL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
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themselves. But Mill clearly recognized that there had to be an adjust-
ment between individual independence and social control; that some
rules of conduct must be imposed primarily by law, but additional rules
of conduct had to be imposed "by opinion on many things which are
not fit subjects for the operation of law."60
He accepted as a principle of a democratic society that the acts of
an individual which might not go the length of violating the legal
rights of others yet might be hurtful to others, or wanting in due
consideration for their welfare and by that reason such action may
then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. 1 It is apparent
that modern governments may generally be divided into two groups:
authoritarian, stressing what is termed efficiency in enforcement with
a minimum regard for the individual; and democratic, stressing not
efficiency in administration, but emphasizing the protection of indi-
vidual non-restraint even possibly at the cost of guarantees of general
security.
In a democracy, criminal law provides the prohibitions directed to
the individual for the purpose of protecting the social interests of the
community. But to protect and preserve the proper residue of the in-
dividual's freedom, which he circumscribed to the extent that it was
necessary to insure its continuing enjoyment, limitations are placed
upon the enforcement of these prohibitions.
The resulting internal push and pull between prohibitions and the
limitations placed upon their enforcement is an essential constituent
part of criminal law. These are the conflicting claims; on the one hand
of the security of social institutions and the proper use of social re-
sources, and on the other, the preservation of free individual initiative
necessary for political and cultural progress. In broad terms, the rules
governing this area of conflict are established by constitutional bills
of rights.
This fundamental philosophy of a democratic society, which is de-
pendent upon the proper administration of government and particu-
larly the administration of criminal justice, should not be overlooked
in any effort to make changes in government. The basic principle of
man's freedom is preserved only by the equally basic principle that the
end of government is the good of the community, and no member of
the community has a right tending to any other end. This necessarily
involves an adjustment between individual liberty and social control
which is effected by two methods: one, by the prohibitions of law
which proscribes certain conduct and makes it illegal, the other by
the condemnation of opinion which proscribes certain conduct as being
detrimental to the common good, though not the subject of legal pro-
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 75.
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hibitions. Both methods of adjustment between individual liberty and
social control must be preserved to prevent constant attempts to erode
individual liberties. Any whittling away of the right of public criti-
cism and attempt to transfer this basic right of freedom to an addi-
tional administrative power, would directly, and in a positive manner,
violate the delicate balance between the protection of the social interest
of the community and the freedom of the individual.
If the power to investigate public officials and report thereon were to
be removed from a short-lived representative group of grand jurors
and placed in the hands of some administrative official, who would
investigate this new official be he Auditor General, Comptroller Gen-
eral, Inspector General, or just plain General? We should bear in
mind the admonition of Learned Hand:
We took the institution [grand jury] as we found it in our English
inheritance, and he best serves the Constitution who most faith-
fully follows its historical significance, not he who by verbal
pedantry tries a priori to formulate its limitations and its extent.62
62. In reK ittle, 180 Fed. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
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